In this paper we present methods for attacking and defending k-gram statistical analysis techniques that are used, for example, in network traffic analysis and covert channel detection. The main new result is our demonstration of how to use a behavior's or process' k-order statistics to build a stochastic process that has those same k-order stationary statistics but possesses different, deliberately designed, (k + 1)-order statistics if desired. Such a model realizes a "complexification" of the process or behavior which a defender can use to monitor whether an attacker is shaping the behavior. By deliberately introducing designed (k + 1)-order behaviors, the defender can check to see if those behaviors are present in the data. We also develop constructs for source codes that respect the k-order statistics of a process while encoding covert information. One fundamental consequence of these results is that certain types of behavior analyses techniques come down to an arms race in the sense that the advantage goes to the party that has more computing resources applied to the problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer security researchers have been investigating statistical behavioral modeling techniques as a means for determining whether a machine, a network or data packet contents are behaving "normally" or not. These are so-called behavior analysis techniques and implicitly model stochastic processes at some level of fidelity.
Consider for example, the problem of detecting covert channels. Some existing approaches assume that an adversary has installed an exfiltrating agent, or Trojan, which operates by encoding data in a way that introduces detectable regularities in some network traffic statistics. For example, Giani et al. [1] and Cabuk et al. [2] estimate certain first order statistics of packet inter-arrival delays in order to determine whether a time covert channel is being used. Dainotti et al. [3] learn a Hidden Markov Process [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] using both packet inter-arrival delays and packet sizes to detect traffic anomalies. Other techniques are based on various analyses of n-gram statistics [9] . In fact, some have called techniques that match n-gram statistics "mimicry attacks" and while techniques have been developed for detecting certain simple types of mimicry, techniques for building mimicry attacks as described in the present paper appear to be novel [9] .
General discussions of covert channels and their taxonomies, existence and modeling have been published [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] . The design, implementation and experimental evaluation of several specific covert channel attacks in real systems is of specific interest [14] . That work presents threat models, achievable bit rates, noise properties and channel capacities for covert channels.
The existence and successful use of a covert channel is based on the assumption that the covert channel code does not perturb the measured statistical properties of behavior so that, over time, a covert transmission does not introduce discernible patterns which are different than expected, at least with respect to what is measured. In this paper we assume the ability to learn a k-gram type model of "normal behavior." This is simply done by counting the occurrences of k-grams and then normalizing to produce frequencies or probabilities. It is important to note that researchers often talk about entropy as a channel statistic [10] , [15] but entropy is typically calculated from k-order statistics so that our methods for preserving k-order statistics preserves all lower order statistics and will also preserve the entropy.
We present a technique for encoding messages that respects these k-order statistics. Both attacker and defender can use this coding technique. The attacker could exfiltrate coded information while the defender could embed an encoded reference message or carrier to detect manipulations of the channel by an adversary attempting covert communications. That is, for any order k, an attacker or a defender can encode covert messages while otherwise respecting the k-order statistics of the traffic.
Also, we show how a defender can create a process of order k + 1 which has the same k-order statistics but specifically designed (k + 1)-order statistics that the defender can easily monitor to see if the (k +1)-order statistics have been changed. Researchers have recently started to develop systematic taxonomies and examples of attacks against statistical machine learning techniques [16] . In that spirit, the present work develops specific techniques to both attack and defend using certain statistical approaches.
We discuss these methods in the context of behaviors that have a finite set of observable symbols (the alphabet). Interpacket arrival times, packet sizes, header fields, packet contents and so on are examples of such observables if quantized into a finite number of bins. Our approach models the observables as a stationary stochastic process X [17] . After estimating the k-order statistics, we build a Probabilistic Deterministic Finite Automata model (PDFA) [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] that realizes the k-order statistics.
Using that PDFA, we show that: 1) an adversary can encode messages covertly while respecting the k-order statistics;
2) the defender can encode reference messages or a carrier while respecting the k-order statistics and;
3) the defender can build a more complex process which has the same k-order statistics but possesses deliberately designed (k + 1)-order statistics.
Examples of such covert channels in network traffic include, but are not restricted to: which can be manipulated by the transmitting entity without violating protocol semantics.
Several such fields are known to exist [22] .
It is important to clarify right away what we mean by a k-order statistic and a k-gram.
Suppose we have an alphabet consisting of {α, β, γ} and we observe a sequence comprised of that alphabet, say αααβαβγγ.
The first order statistics are [1/2 1/4 1/4] indicating that 1/2 of the symbols are α's, 1/4 are β's and 1/4 are γ's. The 1-grams are merely {α, β, γ}.
The 2-grams observed in this sequence are αα, αα, αβ, βα, αβ, βγ, γγ and the 2-order statistics for the 9 possible 2-grams αα, αβ, αγ, βα, ββ, βγ, γα, γβ, γγ are respectively
That is, our k-grams are obtained by moving a sliding window of width k across the data one symbol at a time. This is not to be confused with moving that window across the data sequence k symbols at a time.
The following discussion shows how a timing covert channel can be constructed based on a beacon and argues that a naive encoding of covert messages based on packet inter-arrival times produces a clearly detectable distortion of the 1-order statistics of those time intervals in network traffic [23] , [1] . Figure 1 describes the setup. Machine A sends a regularly timed beacon to machine D. (Such a beacon can be a time server request or a stay alive beacon for instance.) The inter-packet delays seen at machine B are not regular due to internal routing delays in the LAN. (These statistics were actually measured from a regularly timed beacon traveling several hops.) An intruder was able to compromise and control machine B which is inside the local network and a relay for the traffic between A and D. (B could be a proxy server, border router or other device for example.)
Assume we set up a machine C outside the internal network perimeter to check for timing covert channels. C has seen a certain distribution of inter-packet delays coming from A going to D. In this paper, we show how machine B can encode covert messages in the inter-packet delays in such a way that the first order statistics as seen by C remain unchanged from the original distribution. Conversely, we can deliberately defend against such channels by encoding messages so that any manipulation of the delays will be detectable on the outside at machine C, because the covert message will not be received at C. the left. However, the 1-order distribution on the left can be generated either by normal traffic, as it was obtained, or by a covert channel, as we will show.
In this contribution, we develop a more sophisticated approach than the naive approach insofar as we consider also statistics of arbitrarily higher order, i.e. k > 1, and our results effectively show that, for any k, defenders and attackers both have technical approaches for, respectively, attacking or defending a k-order behavior with respect to covert communications. Consequently, the situation is an arms race in the sense that whichever side has the ability to learn the highest order statistics wins.
A. Outline of the Paper
In Section II we present an illustrative example. In Section III we describe our method and show how to manipulate a behavior's statistics with Probabilistic Automata. In Section IV we provide a numerical example. In Section V we show how to use Probabilistic Automata to build a channel code that respects the statistics of traffic up to some predecided order. Finally, Section VI contains some conclusions and future work references.
II. A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate these concepts, consider a simple binary observable with values, 0 and 1. It is assumed that these observables are irrelevant to the normal operation of the underlying system and its semantics. For example, the observables could be quantized inter-arrival times or unused packet header fields.
Assume that the 1-order statistics of these observables are r 0 > 0 and r 1 > 0 with r 0 + r 1 = 1.
This means that the relative frequency of 0's and 1's as observed in the behavior are r 0 and r 1 respectively. Now suppose an attacker has estimated these probabilities and seeks to exfiltrate messages while respecting these probabilities. This is possible and, later in this paper, we review standard source coding ideas that allow the attacker to create such codes efficiently.
In fact, if the messages to be sent are binary and Bernoulli with p = 0.5 (such as for encrypted and/or compressed messages), then there are codes that use 1/H(r 0 ) = 1/H(r 1 ) bits in the covert channel per original message symbol where
) is the entropy function. We show how to construct such codes to respect k-order statistics as well.
By the same token, the defender can encode a reference signal, also respecting the first order statistics as above, which can be decoded and verified at the receiving end.
Note that no specific second order statistics r 00 , r 01 , r 10 and r 11 have been modeled so far, but if the process is modeled by a Bernoulli process with p = r 1 then the second order statistics would be r i · r j = r ij = P rob(ij) = P rob(ji) by independence.
However, the defender can construct a second order process with second order statistics r 00 , r 01 , r 10 and r 11 for which r ij = r i · r j while satisfying the required first order statistics, namely r 0 and r 1 . If the attacker exploits the channel through a purely first order process, the constructed second order statistics r ij will likely not be observed by the defender who could then conclude that the traffic is being shaped by an adversary.
To illustrate this 2-order construction, consider an automaton with two states, Q = {0, 1}, corresponding to the two 1-grams of observables. Let X be the matrix of the transition proba-
We seek PDFAs that have the
Specifically, we seek X that satisfies
with X being a stochastic matrix (non-negative with row sums equal to 1). The class of PDFAs that are 1-order equivalent to the given process is therefore determined by a set of linear equality and inequality constraints as follows:
The four equations are linearly dependent and we can reduce them to the three equations and
There are an infinite number of solutions according to
For example, if r = 0.3, 1 − r = 0.7 then the constraints become:
so letting p 00 = 0.8 we get p 11 = Notice that r 01 = r 10 = 0.14, r 01 + r 00 = r 0 = π 1 = 0.3 and r 01 + r 11 = r 1 = π 2 = 0.7 as required.
Another, equivalent way to derive these relations is to note that there are two trivial solutions for X, namely X 1 = I 2 (the 2 by 2 identity matrix) and
T is the column vector whose entries are all 1's. These two solutions are always different. Moreover, we can see that any convex combination ρX 1 + (1 − ρ)X 2 for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is also a solution to all the constraints and in fact yields the same class of solutions as above.
The point of this example is that we can shape the second order statistics of the observables without changing the first order statistics. In particular, multiple choices for p 00 (and so for r 00 ) are possible, all of which lead to the same 1-order statistics. A defender can shape the second order statistics so that if an attacker only obeys the first order statistics, the defender can detect that the expected second order statistics are wrong.
Note that the second order process in this example satisfies an additional constraint -namely, the marginal distributions must agree with the first order process, namely r 01 + r 11 = r 1 and so on. Moreover, r 01 = r 10 must be true as well (this is a symmetry which arises from considering the 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 transitions in the observed sequence which must be equal). For higher order processes, the construction involves identifying and dealing with additional constraints and finding realizations which satisfy them. These generalizations to higher orders are one of the main contributions of this paper.
To apply this construction to the empirical data shown in Figure 2 , normalize the counts into frequencies or probabilities by dividing by the total packet count. This yields a vector of probabilities:
where the coordinates 1 through 13 correspond to delays of 0.01 through 0.13 in increments of 0.01.
We seek to construct a Markov Chain whose states correspond to observable inter-packet delays and whose transition probabilities, P , describe the probability that one delay follows another. As explained above, P must satisfy two matrix equations (capturing the facts that R is a stationary vector for P and that P is row stochastic) R * P = R and P * 1 = 1 where 1 is the column vector of all ones. Moreover, the entries of P are all non-negative.
In this simple case, there are two solutions which are simple to identify, namely
where I is the 13 by 13 identity matrix. The reader can easily check that both these matrices satisfy the two required matrix equations. This construct is simple for 1-grams but becomes more complex for general k-grams as shown below.
Moreover, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, P α = αP B + (1 − α)P D is also a solution. Whereas P B defines a Bernoulli process and P D describes a completely disconnected Markov Chain with an infinite number of fixed distributions, P α defines a Markov Chain that is irreducible, aperiodic and not a Bernoulli process for any 0 < α < 1 . Therefore, P α can be used by a defender to create specific second order statistics which an attacker would have to first model and then respect.
III. CONSTRUCTING THE AUTOMATA
In this section, we show how to construct automata that can reproduce observed statistics computed from data.
Let Σ = {a, b, c, ...} be the finite observable alphabet and σ = |Σ| < ∞ be the number of observables. We are assuming that we have sequences of observables from which we compute the relative frequencies of k-grams (k ≥ 1):
Here Σ k is the set of k-grams; that is, the set of all possible sequences of length k drawn from the alphabet Σ. as a suffix, creating a periodic string effectively, and counting occurrences in the periodic string.
Moreover, this can be repeated for every 1 < j < k by using a circular buffer appending
will hold for all y ∈ Σ j then. (Details are left to the reader.)
We will now construct a special type of Markov Chain in which Σ k are the states and the semantics of the k-grams are preserved so that if x = ay ∈ Σ k is an observed k-gram, then P (ay, yb) is the probability of transitioning to state yb where both a, b ∈ Σ. Such transitions are the only ones possible in the Markov Chain k-gram model. Such models are called k th -order Markov Models, k Markov Chains or k-gram models by different authors [19] , [24] .
Let π be the vector of measured k-gram statistics, R(x), and let P be the desired Markov
Chain transition probabilities:
where the entries of both π and P are indexed by x, x ∈ Σ k .
The stationary probabilities of the desired Markov Chain are precisely π when the equation πP = π is satisfied. This matrix equation consists of σ k equations and the stochasticity requirement on P is another σ k equations resulting in the following 2σ k equations overall:
x ∈Σ k P (x, x ) = 1, ∀x ∈ Σ k (probability requirements)
where P (x, x ) ≥ 0 as well.
Because of the relationship between k-grams and the Markov Chain that we are seeking to construct, we can only have P (x, x ) = 0 when x = ay and x = yb for some a, b ∈ Σ and y ∈ Σ k−1 . That is, y is the suffix of the state x = ay and we can only transition to states x = yb which have y as a prefix and some suffix b ∈ Σ. Accordingly, for every y ∈ Σ k−1 , we have the
b∈Σ P (ay, yb) = 1, ∀a ∈ Σ (7)
which are completely decoupled from the equations corresponding to (k − 1)-grams other than y. Accordingly, we can solve each system independently.
Noting that the k-grams statistics, R(x), satisfy the marginalization relations which is an identity not involving the unknown P (ay, yb).
Accordingly, there are no more than 2σ − 1 linearly independent equations in (6). In fact, if we define pre(y) to be the number of nonzero R(ay) and post(y) be the number of nonzero R(yb), there are in fact no more than pre(y) · post(y) unknown probabilities, P (ay, yb), and no more than pre(y) + post(y) − 1 independent equations altogether.
A. The Standard Solution
One solution to the equations, which we call the Standard Solution, isP (ay, yb) = R(yb)/R(y) This specific solution has pre(y) · post(y) nonzero probabilities, P (ay, yb), for the substring
By construction, this Markov Chain is irreducible because we have constructed the transition probabilities from a circular buffer so that there is a nonzero probability of going from any state with nonzero probability, namely R(x), to any other state with nonzero probability. If additionally the constructed Standard Solution Markov Chain is aperiodic, its unique stationary distribution is precisely R(x) and its entropy rate is
R(ay)P (ay, yb) log(P (ay, yb)).
B. Extended Solutions
If pre(y) and post(y) are both strictly greater than 1, then pre(y) · post(y) > pre(y) + post(y) − 1. From the theory of linear programming, there are feasible solutions to the linear program defined by (6), (7) and (8) which have no more than pre(y) + post(y) − 1 nonzero coordinates, namely the Basic Feasible Solutions [25] .
Let such a Basic Feasible Solution beP (ay, yb). As derived above, there are solutions with exactly pre(y) · post(y) nonzero coordinates, namely the Standard Solutions,P (ay, yb). Note that strict convex combinations ofP withP , P u = uP + (1 − u)P with 0 < u < 1, define a continuum of solutions to (6), (7) and (8), with each solution corresponding to an irreducible Markov Chain. This is the case because every state is reachable from every other state with nonzero probability due to the construction of the Standard Solution.
Moreover, when pre(y) and post(y) are both strictly greater than 1,P andP are different.
As an aside, we have observed that Basic Feasible Solutions typically result in reducible chains because those solutions involve a minimal number of nonzero transition probabilities.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we demonstrate the constructions described above.
1) We consider data generated by the automata depicted in Figure 3 which is a Hidden Markov The stochastic process of observables is not Markovian of any order as can be seen by the fact that
for any k. Moreover, it can be shown that this process is not equivalent to any Probabilistic Deterministic Finite State Automaton.
We generated a sequence of 1000 observations by performing a simulation of this HMM, starting in state 1.
2) We set k = 2 and computed the statistics R(xy) and R(xyz) by scanning the data sequence from left to right and computing sample averages as appropriate:
R(10) = 0.244 
Observe that R(01) = R(10) which is a necessary regularity that follows from the marginalization property:
In order to be sure that the estimates verify those consistency conditions we have treated the data stream as a circular buffer as described previously.
3) We built the Standard Solution, P , where P (ay, yb) = R(yb)/R(y), and then we computed a different numerical solution,P , of the linear program (6), (7) and (8) . 1 The two solutions are summarized below:
P (00, 00) = 0.678 P (00, 01) = 0.322 P (10, 00) = 0.678 P (10, 01) = 0.322 P (01, 10) = 1.000 P (01, 11) = 0.000 P (11, 10) = 1.000 P (11, 11) = 0.000
(00, 00) = 1.000 P (00, 01) = 0.000 P (10, 00) = 0.000 P (10, 01) = 1.000 P (01, 10) = 1.000 P (01, 11) = 0.000 P (11, 10) = 0.000 P (11, 11) = 1.000
Note that the Basic Feasible Solution,P , has a maximal number of zeros and results in a reducible chain with three communicating classes, namely 00, {01, 10}, 11. By convexity 1P is a Basic Feasible Solution obtained by employing the Matlab linprog function.
P u = u · P + (1 − u) ·P is also a solution, for any 0 < u < 1, so that for u = 0.5 and u = 0.2 we obtain respectively the following two different 2-grams:
P 0.5 (00, 00) = 0.839 P 0.5 (00, 01) = 0.161 P 0.5 (10, 00) = 0.339 P 0.5 (10, 01) = 0.661 P 0.5 (01, 10) = 1.000 P 0.5 (01, 11) = 0.000 P 0.5 (11, 10) = 0.500 P 0.5 (11, 11) = 0.500 
4) Now compare the original 2-order statistics specified by M with the statistics specified by the two new models, namely P 0.5 and P 0.2 as above:
They are numerically identical as expected. Finally we verify that the 3-order statistics are all different from each other and from the 3-order statistics of the original data, R, previously listed. 
These 3-order statistics are calculated using the relationships R(ayb) = R(ay) ·P (ay, yb)
for the variousR, a, y, b. Moreover, the R u are the same convex combinations as the the various P u 's. This example illustrates the various constructions we have described in complete generality in the previous section.
V. A COVERT CHANNEL CODING TECHNIQUE
In the previous section, we showed that given observed string frequencies, R(z), z ∈ Σ k we can construct multiple Markov Chains, M , whose states are the k-grams (z ∈ Σ k ), transition probabilities are P (ay, yb), a ∈ Σ, y ∈ Σ k−1 and whose stationary distributions are precisely the observed R.
We now show how to use such a Markov Chain to encode messages while preserving the statistics, R, of the channel. This means that someone monitoring the channel will observe the same k-gram statistics in spite of the fact that covert messages can be communicated within that channel. As noted before, this can be exploited by either attacker or defender.
Conceptually, the coding concept is the opposite of the classical Shannon Source Coding
Theorem [17] in the sense that traditionally we start with a stochastic source with entropy rate H that we seek to compress into binary strings whereas in this case we start with a collection of 2 r messages which we wish to efficiently encode using the dynamics and statistics of the given stochastic process. Because we have to respect the statistics of the channel, the encoding will typically not be be compressing but expanding the number of bits needed. Nonetheless, we still seek efficiency with respect to observing the channel's k-gram statistics.
In this work, we will assume, for simplicity, that the communication covert channel is noiseless noting that the results can be extended to noisy channels in the traditional way. A more thorough analysis is deferred to a future study in which the Shannon capacity of noisy channels will be considered.
This construction involves several steps:
1) Compute the entropy of the irreducible Markov Chain M , H M , specified by transition probabilities, P M , and stationary distribution, R M :
Note that we construct the Markov Chains to have a given stationary distribution, R, so only P M is different for the different models.
For the examples developed in the previous section, we have computed:
H P = 0.6863 , HP = 0 , H P 0.2 = 0.3165 , H P 0.5 = 0.5520.
Note thatP is entirely deterministic and so has zero entropy. Consequently, in order to encode 2 r covert messages, say C i with 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 r we must have r ≤ nH M or equivalently n ≥ r/H M so n is selected to encode 2 r different covert message sequences accordingly. and assign a sequences of covert messages
where s(j) is recursively defined as the state in which Y s(j−1) (i j ) ended.
Because each random walk in the sequence thus constructed starts in the state in which the previous random walk ended, the concatenated sequence of random walks is also a legal random walk in the Markov Chain, obeying all the transition probabilities. Moreover, the k-gram statistics in the overall concatenated sequence of mn observations is approximately R and approaches R The frequencies of the 13 different delays measured from the codeword sequence are in the right graph. This is to be compared with the left graph which is from the empirical data as in Figure 2 . Someone monitoring the delays would see no change in the distribution but a covert channel is present.
as n → ∞. The encoded sequence is uniquely decodable by the receiver as well.
To illustrate this construction, consider the example presented in the left of Figure 2 where we use the 1-order statistics as in equation (2). We take the convex combination (see Section II)
which results in an entropy of H P = 0.004 as computed from (9) . We build a (2 r , n) codebook as described above with r = 8 and n = r/H P = 1995. That is, this encodes binary sequences of length 8 into inter-packet delays of length 1995. We encoded 16 blocks of 8 random source bits each into 16·1995 = 31920 symbols from the alphabet Σ = {1, 2, . . . , 13} which correspond to the delays in the left graph of Figure 2 . This illustrates empirically the effectiveness of the construction described in this paper. Matlab code for reproducing these results is available upon request.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has demonstrated that covert channels can exist even when arbitrarily high order statistics about a channel are estimated and monitored. The resulting covert channels can be used to either exploit or defend the channel and the advantage goes to the party that has the ability to estimate the highest order statistics.
The adversarial nature of this situation falls within the scope of cognitive attacks [26] , [27].
It can be described in abstract as follows: the environment (for example, inter-packet delays) is modeled as a stochastic process X (such as a Hidden Markov Model, Markov Chain or other formalism). Both the attacker, A, and the defender, D, monitor the environment through functions f A ∈ F and f D ∈ F respectively (for example, f D (X ) could be the probability distribution of k-grams produced by X ).
The attacker guesses f D and manipulates X in order to produce a new process, A(X ), so that covert communications can be performed while respecting the behavior that the defender
On the other hand, the defender, by anticipating the attacker's guess of f D , picks a different This work raises some questions which are deferred to future work. In particular, the following directions are worthy of future investigation:
• Inter-packet delays involve real-world time so the question of stability when shaping the channel must be considered. That is, packets can be delayed by certain times only if there are packets in the queue to be delayed. Discussions of such queuing aspects of timing channels and the possibility of jamming them have been studied [28] . Relating this work to timing channel jamming will be investigated.
• We used a circular buffer in Section IV to numerically estimate k-gram statistics so that the statistics have the required marginalization properties. A single pass, online algorithm for implementing this circular buffer only requires storing the first and last k symbols of the data. In the absence of such a buffer, the empirical statistics will not in general obey the marginalization identities and so some additional processing would be required. The use of singular value decompositions, non-negative matrix factorizations or other decomposition methods for imposing the regularity might be worth exploring further as alternatives to the circular buffer approach.
• In principle, one can attempt to build automata smaller than the Markov Chains we construct.
In particular, Probabilistic Finite Automata (PFA) [29] , [30] , [31] could implement Markov
Chains based on k-grams but using fewer states. Unlike k-gram based Markov Chains, kPSAs have states that are labeled with input sequences of length at most k. So they can be seen as "variable length" k-gram Markov Chains. They can be learned efficiently in the KL-PAC sense [32] , [33] , [34] and are generally smaller than k-gram based Markov chains (by having fewer states).
• Within the space of possible Markov Chains that realize given k-gram statistics, it would be good to select the "best" chain from the point of maximizing entropy so that the covert channel coding is as efficient as possible. Our experiments suggest that the so-called Standard Solutions presented in Section III-A have the largest entropy although we have not been able to prove that analytically.
• It is reasonable to ask how our results relate to the use of Hidden Markov Models for modeling traffic, as for example in [3] . It is known that a Hidden Markov Model with n states is completely determined by the 2n-grams produced by the model so that reproducing 2n-gram statistics will result in the same n state Hidden Markov Model [8] .
